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A Game Theory Approach
Major Geoffrey G. BOWMAN＊
Abstract
 The nations of the world spend a signifi cant portion of their wealth on militaries. Every year, 
billions of dollars go to recruiting, training, maintaining, and equipping the men and women who 
serve their countries in uniform. This paper looks into one aspect of military spending, acquiring 
new equipment and systems. In particular, the research focuses on international cooperation in 
weapon system development and proposes a model to aid decision makers to decide whether and 
when to join a joint development program. The main goal is to determine what factors are most 
important in choosing military acquisitions program partners and then to create a model using those 
factors that will produce policy recommendations for program cooperation.
Keywords : Game Theory, Military Cooperation, Acquisitions, Procurement
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1.  Introduction and Background
 Cooperation between nations in military acquisitions is a way in which countries can lower the fi nancial 
burden of national defense. However, deciding what programs as well as at what point in the development 
of those programs to join are diffi cult policy problems that the world’s military leadership must solve. 
This paper presents a model to aid in this decision making process developed by an analysis of interna-
tional military acquisitions programs that uses game theory as its basis. The model also uses the United 
States Department of Defense’s (US DoD) Acquisition Management procedures to provide more of its 
framework. From inputs such as estimated costs, program security level, program technology level, and an 
evaluation of a partner country’s ability to contribute to the weapon program, the model calculates the 
estimated security per unit cost of the program and the estimated security per unit purchased of the 
weapon system. As an example, the model could calculate the amount of security per dollar gained by 
developing and acquiring a new fl eet of 100 fi ghter jets.
 The paper follows this introduction with the connections the research has to international public policy 
as well as information on both the United States Department of Defense acquisition management process. 
Section 2 delves into some ongoing cases of international military acquisition programs used to determine 
the important factors a country considers when deciding whether to enter into a joint development 
program. The model is developed in Section 3 including variable defi nition and model payoff functions. 
Section 4 presents an example of how this model could be used in a hypothetical international community 
with example weapon programs. Finally, Section 5 concludes the paper with a qualitative analysis of the 
example model recommendation, and a presentation of the proposed use of this initial version of the 
model.
 Military spending makes up a large portion of most nations’ budgets. Each country must determine its 
own policies for the best way to obtain and use these large sums of money in order to maintain their 
military. For concrete numbers, one can turn to the United States Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)’s 
World Factbook. (CIA World Factbook, 2014) According to the CIA, the fi ve top economies in the world 
by GDP in 2013 were 1: United States, 2: China, 3: India, 4: Japan, and 5: Germany. (CIA World 
Factbook, 2014) The military spending of just these fi ve nations exceeded $1 trillion in 2013. While this 
total includes more than just the costs of acquiring new equipment, acquisitions makes up a large 
proportion of the total. For instance, of the approximately $550 billion the United States spent on its 
military in 2012, roughly $200 billion went to acquiring new equipment through the acquisitions process. 
(Riley 2012, 398)
 The domestic defense budget decisions of a country often extend well beyond that country’s border when 
the purchase of foreign equipment is necessary to meet national defense needs. For example, the F‒16 
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fi ghter aircraft from the US, is fl own by 28 countries around the world. (F‒16 Fighting Falcon, 2014) 
Many countries look to international suppliers because they lack the economic, industrial, or techno-
logical ability to develop weapons programs on their own. If national defense acquisition needs cannot be 
met through domestic means, a nation must develop policies for importing weapon systems from abroad. 
Additionally, weapons exporting nations must decide if selling weapons is in their best interest. The 
answer is not only based on the fi nancial benefi ts of the sale, but must also consider potential future 
national security concerns.
 The large amount of money allocated to military spending in general and on new system acquisitions in 
particular combined with the complex business of international military sales and joint development 
programs show how important this problem is on the international relations and public policy agendas. 
With the importance of national defense and the responsibility of being good stewards of the taxpayers’ 
money in mind, policy makers around the world must keep the issue of military acquisitions in mind. 
Policy makers at the US Department of Defense (DoD) have developed the method which this paper uses 
as part of the framework for model presented in Section 3. Most importantly, the DoD defi nes three 
general stages of the acquisition process, the Pre-Systems Acquisition stage, the Systems Acquisition 
stage, and the Sustainment stage. (Operation of the Defense Acquisition System 2008, 12) These stages 
are used by the model as steps at which a country can decide to join an international weapons program.
2.  Case Studies
 Section 2 deals with case studies of some international military acquisition program cases. An analysis 
of these cases gives justifi cation to the structure of the model presented in Section 3 as well as provides 
some insights into what factors nations fi nd important when determining the kinds of military weapons 
technology to share with other nations. The three case studies researched are the F‒35 Lightning II 
multi-role jet fi ghter aircraft program, a potential military cooperation deal between Japan and Australia 
for conventional submarine technology, and a Swedish and Brazilian program involving the Saab Gripen 
NG. Finally. Section 2.4 discusses how the information learned from these case studies applies to this 
paper’s model.
2.1  Case Study 1 – Joint Strike Fighter
 The fi rst case researched involves the Joint Strike Fighter program, an international military acquisition 
program whereby 11 nations will build and deploy the Lockheed Martin F‒35 fi ghter aircraft. This case 
study shows partner nations joining the program during the three distinct stages mentioned in Section 1. 
The US started the program and was joined by the United Kingdom during the Pre-Systems Acquisition 
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stage. After the selection of the F‒35 as the Joint Strike Fighter winner, Australia, Canada, Denmark, Italy, 
the Netherlands, Norway, and Turkey all joined in the Acquisition stage. Finally, Israel, Japan, and South 
Korea decided to join the F‒35 program as Foreign Military Sales partners in the Sustainment phase. 
Some benefi ts of having the same weapon system are that partners will share common sustainment and 
maintenance chores and each country will be able to share any potential enhancements thereby allowing 
each nation’s fl eet of F‒35s to benefi t from lessons learned. However, the amount of infl uence a country 
has on the initial product depends on when that country joins the program. (About the F‒35 2014)
2.2  Case Study 2 – Japanese/Australian Submarine Program
 The second case involves a potential naval warship deal in the Asian-Pacifi c region between Japan and 
Australia. This Australian national defense program is researching the possibility of purchasing Soryu 
diesel submarines built by Japanese defense companies. (Kelly, Siegel 2014) One main feature of the 
Soryu class submarine that attracted Australian attention is the silent running diesel electric propulsion 
system. By means of this system, the new Australian submarines would be able to reach deep into the 
Indian Ocean while limiting an opponent’s ability to detect them. However, The Japan/Australia joint 
submarine program faces many impediments. Even though Australia has stated a willingness to produce 
parts of the submarines domestically, the US based think tank RAND Corporation says that there are not 
enough Australian engineers for the project. (Kelly, Siegel 2014) On the Japanese side, senior Maritime 
Defense Force offi cials have stated their reluctance in releasing the silent running diesel electric 
propulsion to an overseas partner for security reasons despite the fact that exporting the technology would 
spread costs over a larger production base thereby increasing effi ciency. (Kelly, Siegel 2014)
2.3  Case Study 3 – Sweden/Brazil Jet Fighter Program
 The third case in this section looks into an ongoing program between Sweden and Brazil involving the 
Swedish designed Saab Gripen NG multi-role jet fi ghter aircraft. The Brazilian Ministry of Defense 
announced that the Saab Gripen won their F‒X2 competition on 18 December 2013. According to Brazil’s 
Minister of Defense Celso Armorim, the Gripen was selected for three reasons: performance, effective 
technology transfer, and costs. (A Win for Saab: Brazil Opts of the Gripen NG 2013) The cost per 
purchase and the cost for maintenance and sustainment per fl ight hour is much less than other 
competitors. (Gripen: Proud to be Brazilian 2014) However, most importantly, Brazil’s deal with Sweden 
includes full technology transfer of all aspects of the Gripen design. This will allow the Brazilian-based 
Embraer aircraft company to produce, assemble, test, and upgrade Gripens domestically in partnership 
with Saab. Therefore, Sweden can further improve the Gripen design by incorporating the skills of the 
Brazilian aircraft industry while simultaneously opening the possibility of further aircraft exports to other 
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South American nations. (Gripen: Proud to be Brazilian 2014)
2.4  Case Study Analysis
 An analysis of the three case studies presented above reveals some of the reasons nations choose to join 
in international weapon development programs and some of the factors that go into deciding which 
program to join. First, each case shows some decisions partners must consider in determining when to 
join a program. In the F‒35 program, the UK joined very early in the process and therefore had the most 
opportunity to infl uence the direction of F‒35 design. Several other nations joined during the Acquisition 
stage and have had some infl uence on the design through domestic production of common F‒35 subcom-
ponents and participation in sustainment procedure development. Finally, Japan and Israel have very little 
ability to change F‒35 design to their own particular national defense needs since they are buying fi nished 
models as part of the Foreign Military Sales program. Similarly, in the second case, Australia would not 
be able to change the design of the Soryu class submarine’s silent running diesel electric propulsion 
system since this subsystem would be purchased whole. In the third case, Sweden and Brazil’s agreement 
encourages design revisions as the Gripen NG is still in the Acquisition Stage equivalent thereby allowing 
Brazil to shape the fi nal product more to their own needs.
 The case studies also show that countries consider several factors before deciding to participate in joint 
weapon development programs. One factor is security. The US has defense treaties with all of its partners 
in the F‒35 program. These treaties are one reason the technology transfer involved in the joint 
development takes place. Although the F‒35 has many innovative features, the US maintains good enough 
relations with the program partner nations through defense alliances that cooperation on this level is seen 
as a matter of course. On the other hand, Japan has stated some serious reservations about selling Soryu 
class engines to Australia. The design of the engines is a closely held military secret and Australia and 
Japan have not yet developed a well-defi ned defense alliance.
 Another factor to consider is technology level. As mentioned above, Australia could not provide much 
potential enhancement to the Soryu class submarine program because of its lack of engineers. Contrary to 
that, because of its large domestic aircraft industry, Brazil offers Sweden a wealth of knowledge to 
improve the ongoing Gripen NG program. In addition to the synergistic effects that accompany techno-
logical cooperation, these programs also have the potential for improved security through interoperability 
synergy. The F‒35 alliance partners gain additional benefi ts in sustainability and interoperability by 
sharing their knowledge and lessons learned from using the same aircraft. Also, maintenance facilities 
will be the same for any base that houses F‒35s making it easy to host alliance deployments.
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3.  Model Development
 This section presents the details of the international military acquisitions model created for this paper. 
The structure of the model is defi ned to include the players, strategies, and decision timeline. This basic 
structure is accompanied by diagrams of the model’s extended form. Also presented are the mathematical 
portions of the model’s payoff equations, defi nitions of the terminology used therein, and how the payoff 
equations relate to the case study analysis above. The payoff equations are based in part on the partici-
pating players and the weapon program being modeled so these factors will also be discussed.
3.1  Structure
 The players, strategies, and decision timeline defi ne the structure of this model. First, there are two 
players that represent countries deciding policies for international military acquisitions cooperation. Player 
1 is defi ned as the country where the weapon program originates and Player 2 is another country that 
could potentially join in the acquisition process. Each player has a set of strategies. Player 1 has the 
following three strategies: 1) Invite Player 2 to join the weapon program, 2) Continue Solo Development, 
and 3) Cancel Program. Player 2’s strategies are 1) Join the program to acquire some whole number of 
weapon system units, or 2) Not Join the program. These strategies are abbreviated as A1, A2, and A3 for 
Player 1; and B1(#) and B2 for Player 2 with # being the number of whole units Player 2 acquires. The 
model also assumes that players cannot leave a program until completion. Finally the decision timeline is 
Figure 1  International Military Acquisition Program Model Extended Form
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broken into three stages: Stage 1 – Pre-Systems Acquisition, Stage 2 – Systems Acquisition, and Stage 3 – 
Sustainment as per the information presented in Sections 1 and 2. The extended form of the model, 
shown in Figure 1, shows a tree-like diagram representing the model structure described above.
 The ovals with P1 or P2 written inside them represent decision points or nodes for either Player 1 or 
Player 2. The connecting arrows labeled by A1, A2, A3, B1, or B2 are the strategies that a player can 
execute based on a particular decision node. The stages mentioned along the bottom of the model are the 
Pre-Systems Acquisitions, Systems Acquisitions, and Sustainment stages from above. The rectangles 
represent the 22 potential outcomes of the model. Each player’s payoffs are partially based on the 
strategies used to reach a certain outcome.
3.2  Payoff Function Value Defi nitions
 A payoff equation for each player has been created to account for each of the 22 outcomes in the model. 
The payoff functions use a set of common values based on player’s evaluations of each other, of the 
program, and on aspects that can be determined during program negotiations. The payoff functions 
calculate a value for the amount of security gained per unit cost for each player in each of the outcomes. 
Then, by means of backward induction, the model predicts the set of strategies followed by each player.
 This model uses four types of values. The fi rst type is based on evaluations of one player by the other. 
Each player selects a value for Player 2’s technological ability. This value ranges continuously from 0, 
meaning no technical ability to contribute to the weapon program, to 1 meaning world leader in a 
technical area. As mentioned in the case studies, the technological ability of a potential partner nation has 
some impact on whether and when an invitation to join the program is sent. Each player also evaluates 
their relationship with the other. This value also ranges continuously from 0, meaning completely antago-
nistic, to 1, meaning completely cooperative. The JSF and Soryu class Submarine cases give evidence as 
to the importance of the relationship between potential partner nations. Next the model’s payoff equations 
use variables that determine how much additional gain in security and cost savings the players through 
cooperation. The value is a positive real number that takes into account how complimentary the efforts of 
the partners are in addition to their individual inputs as is commonly used in strategic complement 
partnership games in game theory. (Watson 2013, 82) The P2S3 value is used for interoperability 
cooperation. This value also varies continuously from 0 to 1 with 0 meaning no overlap in national 
security interests and 1 meaning exactly the same national security interests. As an example, the 
Kingdom of Swaziland and the Federated States of Micronesia could use a P2S3 value close to 0 as their 
national security interests likely have little overlap.
 The next type of values are those based on a player’s evaluation of the weapon system program. There 
are fi ve cost values based on Player 1’s estimates of the overall program cost. These include the initial 
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cost of determining there is a national security defi ciency that must be addressed (Ci). The model also 
uses the cost estimates to complete Stages 1, 2, and 3 (C1,  C2, and  C3). The fi nal cost covers the work 
required to send invitations, evaluate the proposal, and negotiate an agreement (I ).
 Next, the number of weapon system units Player 1 (Up1) acquires is set by the model. Another value 
Player 1 chooses is the program’s level of security (Ps) which, in conjunction with a player’s relationship 
value, the model uses to determine if sharing military technology of that security level is Player 1’s best 
national interest. For example, the Japanese are determining if their silent running diesel electric 
propulsion system is too secret to sell to Australia. The value of the program security variable ranges 
from 0 (open to anyone) to 1 (as secretive as possible). Player 1 also determines the weapon system 
program’s technological requirement level (Pt) and the program technological cooperation diffi culty value 
(Pd). The Pt level varies between 0 and 1 corresponding to the expected technological rigors of the 
weapon system development with a value of 0 meaning technologically easy and a value of 1 meaning 
technologically diffi cult. The Pd value is greater than 1 and is used to calculate how much technological 
assistance a country can provide depending on their abilities (P2tech1 or P2tech2) and the program’s techno-
logical requirements level (Pt ). Higher values of Pd mean that partner countries provide exponentially less 
benefi t through cooperation if their technological levels are less than the program’s technological 
requirement level. The last two program specifi c values are estimates of national security gained per unit 
from a weapon program without cooperation for both Players 1 and 2. It should be noted that this paper 
does not propose to defi ne the security per unit value.
 The third value type is based on considerations that are part of the negotiations during which the players 
agree to cooperate on a joint program. The fi rst of these are the amount Player 1 adjusts costs already 
paid for weapon development to date when including Player 2. These are based on which stage Player 2 
joins the program and are set such that Player 1 recoups some of the money already spent or gives Player 
2 a discount on program costs. The values for these variables are real numbers ranging from 0, meaning a 
portion of the weapon development is free to Player 2, up to infi nity with a value of 1 meaning Player 1 
and Player 2 pay proportionally the same amount.
 The fi nal type of values are used to activate certain portions of the equations. They are either 0 or 1 
based on the outcome for which a payoff is being calculated. The fi rst three of these values are N1, N2 and 
N3 where a value of 1 means Player 1 has decided to continue the project at Stage 1, 2 or 3 respectively 
and a value of 0 means that Player 1 has decided to cancel the program at those stages. Values V1, V2, and 
V3 are set to 1 if Player 1 extends an invitation to Player to join the program at Stage 1, 2, and/or 3 
respectively, but are set to 0 if no invitation is sent at a stage. Finally, J1, J2, and J3 are set to equal 1 if 
Player 2 joins at Stage 1, 2 or 3 respectively, and set to 0 if player 1 decides not to join at a stage. Table 1 
below presents a summary of all the variables used in the payoff functions in this model.
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Table 1  Model Variables’ Defi nitions
Variable Symbol Range, Units Defi nition
P2tech1 0 ≤ P2tech1 ≤ 1 Player 1’s evaluation of Player 2’s pertinent technological ability
P2tech2 0 ≤ P2tech2 ≤ 1 Player 2’s evaluation of Player 2’s pertinent technological ability
Prel1 0 ≤ Prel1 ≤ 1 Player 1’s evaluation of relationship with Player 2
Prel2 0 ≤ Prel2 ≤ 1 Player 2’s evaluation of relationship with Player 1
Ci Ci ≥ 0, monetary Cost of initiating the weapon system development program
C1 C1 ≥ 0, monetary Cost of weapon system development program during Stage 1
C2 C2 ≥ 0, monetary Cost of weapon system development program during Stage 2
C3 C3 ≥ 0, monetary Cost of weapon system development program during Stage 3
I I ≥ 0, monetary Cost of participating in negotiations to join weapon program
Up1 Up1 ≥ 0, integer Number of weapon system units Player 1 will acquire (constant)
Up2 Up2 ≥ 0, integer Number of weapon system units Player 2 will acquire (variable)
Ps 0 ≤ Ps ≤ 1 Player 1’s evaluation of the weapon system’s security level
Pt 0 ≤ Pt ≤ 1 Player 1’s evaluation of the weapon system’s technology level
Pd Pd > 1 Player 1’s evaluation of the weapon system’s technological diffi culty level
( Sp1　　u )i Left as variable Evaluation of national security gained by Player 1 per unit of weapon system acquired prior to any program cooperation
( Sp2　　u )i Left as variable Evaluation of national security gained by Player 2 per unit of weapon system acquired prior to any program cooperation
Mf1 Mf1 ≥ 0 Change in amount Player 1 charges Player 2 for all work completed prior to 
Player 2 joining the program in Stage 1
Mf2 Mf2 ≥ 0 Change in amount Player 1 charges Player 2 for all work completed prior to 
Player 2 joining the program in Stage 2
Mf3 Mf3 ≥ 0 Change in amount Player 1 charges Player 2 for all work completed prior to 
Player 2 joining the program in Stage 3
P2S1 0 ≤ P2S1 ≤ 1 Cooperation synergy factor for joint work done during Stage 1
P2S2 0 ≤ P2S2 ≤ 1 Cooperation synergy factor for joint work done during Stage 2
P2S3 0 ≤ P2S3 ≤ 1 How closely the 2 players’ national security concerns interact
N1 0 or 1 1 if Player 1 continues weapon program in Stage 1, otherwise 0
N2 0 or 1 1 if Player 1 continues weapon program in Stage 2, otherwise 0
N3 0 or 1 1 if Player 1 continues weapon program in Stage 3, otherwise 0
V1 0 or 1 1 if Player 1 invites Player 2 in Stage 1, otherwise 0
V2 0 or 1 1 if Player 1 invites Player 2 in Stage 2, otherwise 0
V3 0 or 1 1 if Player 1 invites Player 2 in Stage 3, otherwise 0
J1 0 or 1 1 if Player 2 joins weapon program in Stage 1, otherwise 0
J2 0 or 1 1 if Player 2 joins weapon program in Stage 1, otherwise 0
J3 0 or 1 1 if Player 2 joins weapon program in Stage 1, otherwise 0
国際公共政策研究  第20巻第 1号106
3.3  Equations
 The payoff equations for this model are designed to allow fl exibility within the structure presented above. 
Once the evaluations of player’s relationship, technological ability, program security level, technological 
needs, per player per unit initial security gain, negotiations, and cooperation factors are set, the payoff 
functions use the number of units Player 2 acquires as the independent variable and security gained per 
unit money as the dependent variable. The strategies executed by both players activate or de-activate 
portions of the payoff equations to calculate the payoff values for each player in each outcome of the 
model. To create this fi nal function, the model calculates the fi nal per unit security gain and the fi nal 
program cost for each player for each of the 22 distinct outcomes. The security gain portion of the 
equations are created such that working together in Stage 1 or Stage 2 with a close enough ally (Ps <Prel1) 
that has the technological ability to contribute to the weapon system program (Pt <P2tech1) should yield 
some additional security gains through the synergistic cooperation. However, if these thresholds are not 
met, there will be minimal security gain or a possible security loss through pursuing a joint program. The 
cost portion of the equations also takes into account the possibility of synergistic cooperation. However, 
Player 1 can also adjust how much of the already completed development cost Player 2 must pay for 
through the Mf1, Mf2, or Mf3 values.
Player 1 security gain equation:
Sp1 =  
Sp1　　
u
 
i
＊Up1＊N3
+  
Sp1　　
u
 
i
＊P2S1＊(Prel1-Ps)＊(PdP2tech1 -Pt -1)＊ Up2　　　　Up1+Up2 ＊Up1
+ +  
Sp1　　
u
 
i
＊P2S2＊(Prel1-Ps)＊(PdP2tech1 -Pt -1)＊ Up2　　　　Up1+Up2 ＊Up1　 ＊J1
+ 
Sp2　　
u
 
i
＊(Prel1-Ps)＊P2S3＊Up2
  
Sp1　　
u
 
i
＊P2S2＊(Prel1-Ps)＊(PdP2tech1 -Pt -1)＊ Up2　　　　Up1+Up2 ＊Up1 + 　　 　　 ＊J2
+ 
Sp2　　
u
 
i
＊(Prel1-Ps)＊P2S3＊Up2
+ 
Sp2　　
u
 
i
＊(Prel1-Ps)＊P2S3＊Up2＊J3
Player 1 program costs equation:
Cp1 = Ci +I＊V1+I＊V2 +I＊V3 + C1＊N1+ C2＊N2 + C3＊N3
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- (C1+ C2 + C3)＊Prel1＊(P2tech1-Pt)＊P2S1＊
Up2　　　　
Up1+Up2 + 　　 　　 ＊J1
+ (1-Mf1)＊Ci＊
Up2　　　　
Up1+Up2
- (C2 + C3)＊Prel1＊(P2tech1-Pt)＊P2S2＊
Up2　　　　
Up1+Up2 + 　　 　　 ＊J2
+ (1-Mf2)＊(Ci + C1)＊
Up2　　　　
Up1+Up2
+ (1-Mf3)＊(Ci + C1+ C2 + C3)＊
Up2　　　　
Up1+Up2
＊J3
Player 2 security gain equation:
 
Sp2　　
u
 
i
＊Up2
+  
Sp2　　
u
 
i
＊P2S1＊(Prel2 -Ps)＊(PdP2tech2 -Pt -1)＊ Up2　　　　Up1+Up2 ＊Up2 Sp2 = 　 　 ＊J1
+  
Sp2　　
u
 
i
＊P2S2＊(Prel2 -Ps)＊(PdP2tech2 -Pt -1)＊ Up2　　　　Up1+Up2 ＊Up2
+  
Sp1　　
u
 
i
＊(Prel2 -Ps)＊P2S3＊Up1
 
Sp2　　
u
 
i
＊Up2
+ +  
Sp2　　
u
 
i
＊P2S2＊(Prel2 -Ps)＊(PdP2tech2 -Pt -1)＊ Up2　　　　Up1+Up2 ＊Up2 ＊J2
+  
Sp1　　
u
 
i
＊(Prel2 -Ps)＊P2S3＊Up1
+  
Sp2　　
u
 
i
＊Up2 +  
Sp1　　
u
 
i
＊(Prel2 -Ps)＊P2S3＊Up1 ＊J3
Player 2 program costs equation:
Cp2 = I＊V1+I＊V2 +I＊V3
(C1+ C2 + C3)＊
Up2
　　　　
Up1+Up2
+ - (C1+ C2 + C3)＊Prel2＊(P2tech2 -Pt)＊P2S1＊
Up2
　　　　
Up1+Up2
 ＊J1
+Mf1＊Ci＊
Up2
　　　　
Up1+Up2
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 (C2 + C3)＊
Up2
　　　　
Up1+Up2
+ - (C2 + C3 )＊Prel2＊(P2tech2 -Pt)＊P2S2＊
Up2
　　　　
Up1+Up2
 ＊J2
+Mf2＊(Ci + C1)＊
Up2
　　　　
Up1+Up2
+Mf3＊(Ci + C1+ C2 + C3)＊
Up2
　　　　
Up1+Up2
＊J3
 Using the model structure and payoff functions defi ned in this section, Section 4 provides a demon-
stration of how this model can be used to provide policy recommendations for potential international 
military acquisitions programs.
4.  Example Cases
 In Section 4, a sample international community is created to demonstrate how the model provides policy 
recommendations for particular weapon development programs. Six countries comprise this sample inter-
national community including the project originator, two countries that enjoy a close relationship to the 
project originator, two countries that are antagonistic to the project originator, and one neutral country. 
These names are fi ctional and not intended to represent any real country. The project originator country, 
is designated Asu and represents Player 1 for the purposes of the model. Therefore, the example in this 
section will present the models results for Asu and each of the remaining fi ve countries. Asu is a techno-
logically advanced nation and is assumed to have suffi cient budget to complete the projects solo. Pajan 
and Romincan Depublic are both close allies of Asu, but Pajan has a large budget and high levels of 
technological achievements whereas Romincan Depublic does not. The antagonistic countries are Nicha 
and North Rokea. Nicha and Asu are near peer rivals in technology and military budget but North Rokea 
has only meager means and limited ability to design advanced weapons domestically. The fi nal country, 
Keximo has fair relations with Asu, a moderate level of technological achievement and maintains a 
moderate military budget.
 In addition to the six countries, this example includes two fi ctional weapon development programs. The 
fi rst is the X‒69 Belchfi re, a new generation of jet fi ghter aircraft that incorporates many advanced 
technologies so the project technology level (Pt) is close to 1. The program security level (Ps) for the X‒
69 is also near 1 meaning Asu does not want their advanced designs to go just anywhere. Finally, the 
costs (Ci, C1, C2, C3) and expected security gain per item (  Sp1　　u  i,   Sp2　　u  i) are both high. The second 
program is the BFG Infantry Support Weapon. The BFG program does not incorporate any technological 
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advancements but instead uses universally understood technologies to improve performance over the 
previous editions of Asu’s infantry support weapons. Because infantry support weapons are used by all 
six nations, Asu evaluates the program security level as near 0. Individual BFGs will not provide as much 
security as X‒69s, but because of the lower program costs potential partners can acquire more units. 
Tables 2 and 3 below defi ne the values for each country per project and are taken as givens in the model’s 
calculations.
Table 2  Country Interaction Values Chart
Variable Pajan Rominican Depublic Nicha North Rokea Keximo
P2tech1 (X‒69) 0.95 0.05 0.95 0.05 0.5
P2tech1 (BFG) 1 0.7 1 0.7 0.9
P2tech2 (X‒69) 0.95 0.05 0.95 0.05 0.5
P2tech2 (BFG) 1 0.75 1 0.9 0.9
Prel1 0.9 0.9 0.15 0.1 0.5
Prel2 0.9 0.95 0.2 0.05 0.5
Mf1 1 1 1.1 1.1 1.1
Mf2 1 1 1.2 1.2 1.2
Mf3 1.1 1.1 1.3 1.3 1.3
P2S1 0.5 0.5 0.1 0.1 0.2
P2S2 0.5 0.5 0.1 0.1 0.2
P2S3 1 1 1 1 1
( Sp1　　u )i (X‒69) 12 5 8 5 15
( Sp2　　u )i (BFG) 1 1 1 1 1
Budget $500,000,000 $100,000,000 $1,000,000,000 $100,000,000 $500,000,000
Table 3  Program Specifi c Values Chart
X‒69 BFG
Ci $1,000,000 $1,000,000
C1 $999,000,000 $999,000,000
C2 $2,500,000,000 $2,500,000,000
C3 $1,500,000,000 $1,500,000,000
I $50,000 $50,000
Up1 1,000 10,000
Ps 0.8 0.3
Pt 0.9 0.1
Pd 2 2
( Sp1　　u )i 10 1
国際公共政策研究  第20巻第 1号110
 The program cost is calculated from which, based on each country’s budget, the total number of units 
Player 2 should purchase to maximize their payoff at each outcome is determined. The security gained 
per unit cost is then calculated and each outcome’s ordered pair of values for Players 1 and 2 are available 
for analysis in the model via backward induction. The fi nal output from the model is a recommended set 
of strategies for each player to reach the optimal outcome. Table 4 below displays the results of the model 
analysis.
Table 4  Model Results
Player 1 Player 2
Program Country Recommended 
Outcome
Sp1　　Cp1 
Strategies Sp2　　Cp2 
Strategies
X‒69 Pajan U2 2.04227E‒06 A1,X,X 2.97446E‒06 B1(113),X,X
Rominican 
Depublic
U10 2.00533E‒06 A2,A2,A1 1.20247E‒06 X,X,B1(18)
Nicha U8 0.000002 A2,A2,A2 0 X,X,X
North Rokea U8 0.000002 A2,A2,A2 0 X,X,X
Keximo U8 0.000002 A2,A2,A2 0 X,X,X
BFG Pajan U2 2.60771E‒06 A1,X,X 6.84231E‒06 B1(2019),X,X
Rominican 
Depublic
U2 2.0785E‒06 A1,X,X 4.95664E‒06 B1(297),X,X
Nicha U10 2.04835E‒06 A2,A2,A1 1.63626E‒06 X,X,B1(1818)
North Rokea U10 2.00297E‒06 A2,A2,A1 1.17126E‒06 X,X,B1(156)
Keximo U2 2.08197E‒06 A1,X,X 2.94474E‒06 B1(1219),X,X
 There are several policy recommendations that follow from the results of the model listed in Table 5 
above. First, looking at the programs individually, in the X‒69 program, Asu should invite Pajan in Stage 
1, invite Rominican Depublic to join in Stage 3, and not invite the other 3 countries. Pajan should join the 
X‒69 program by acquiring 113 planes. This number of units comes from Pajan’s available budget divided 
by the Pajan’s cost per unit as estimated by the model in outcome U2. Other recommended number of 
units are calculated similarly. Rominican Depublic should join the X‒69 program and buy 18 planes. Next, 
for the BFG program, Asu should invite Pajan, Rominican Depublic, and Keximo each to join in Stage 1. 
Pajan should join in Stage 1 and acquire 2019 BFGs, Rominican Depublic should join in Stage 1 and 
acquire 297 BFGs, and Keximo should join the in Stage 1 and acquire 1219 BFGs. ASU should invite 
both Nicha and North Rokea to join the BFG program in Stage 3. Both Nicha and North Rokea should 
join the BFG program and buy 1818 and 156 BFGs respectively.
 Additionally, the model outcomes allow for analysis of programs within one country. For instance, from 
Table 4 Pajan’s estimated security gain per unit cost for the BFG program is 6.84231＊10‒6 and the 
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estimated security gain per unit cost for the X‒69 program is 2.97446E＊10‒6. So, through cooperation on 
these programs, the model estimates that Pajan would gain approximately twice as much security by 
joining the BFG program than by joining the X‒69 program. Therefore, in the absence of any other 
military acquisition programs, Pajan should spend its budget on buying BFGs. Rominican Depublic gets 
approximately four times as much security gain per unit cost for the BFG program than the X‒69 
program. Therefore, Rominican Depublic should also spend their budget on BFGs if there are no other 
military acquisition programs available. In Section 5 the focus is on qualitative assessments of the 
model’s policy recommendations.
5.  Qualitative Assessment and Conclusions
 Section 5 begins with a qualitative look at the model’s policy recommendations from the example in 
Section 4, and concludes with a discussion of the model applicability and its proposed place in the 
military public policy process. Using the variables defi ned in the example from Section 4, the model 
results lead to recommendations for how each country should direct their military acquisitions policies. 
The model recommended that Asu and Pajan should join together during Stage 1 on both the X‒69 and the 
BFG projects. Because of the two countries’ good relations and Pajan’s high technological ability this 
early cooperation makes sense. More cooperation on the project should yield a better end product as each 
country’s experts work together on the design and production. Also, because Asu and Pajan share good 
relations, a stronger military, through improved equipment, should make the alliance stronger. The model 
predicts that the security gained per unit cost for the BFG program is greater than that of the X‒69 
program. Therefore, with its available budget, Pajan would do best to acquire only BFGs.
 The recommendations for Asu and Rominican Depublic were for cooperation but at different stages of 
the projects. First, because of Rominican Depublic’s lack of expertise in aircraft manufacturing, the model 
recommended that Asu not extend an invitation until Stage 3. At that point, Rominican Depublic should 
buy a limited number of X‒69s. This prediction makes sense because Asu would not gain any benefi t 
through design cooperation with Rominican Depublic. However, because of their close relations, both 
nations benefi t from the other’s stronger military so cooperation is warranted. In the BFG project, the 
model recommended that Asu and Rominican Depublic begin their cooperation at Stage 1. Rominican 
Depublic’s technological ability in infantry support weapons was enough that early cooperation yields a 
better fi nal product.
 The model recommended that the best course of interaction between Asu and Nicha was no invitation 
for the X‒69 program and cooperation in Stage 3 of the BFG program. Despite Nicha’s advanced techno-
logical ability, the two countries should not cooperate on the X‒69 program because of poor relations and 
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high program security. Exporting or collaborating on advanced weapons technology with a potential rival 
should reduce security because of the possibility of having to fi ght against a rival armed with that 
technology. However, even with that in mind, the model recommended that Asu should invite Nicha to 
join the BFG program in Stage 3. This recommendation stemmed from the monetary gains associated 
with the defi ned mark-up value overcoming the loss in security of selling a weapon system to potential 
rival country. The program security for the BFG program was not high so the loss of security due to 
Nicha joining the program was less than with the X‒69 program. Therefore Asu’s monetary gain from 
BFM exports to Nicha should overcome the small loss of security. This case has historical precedence for 
example between Germany and Republican Spain during the Spanish Civil War. Despite fi ghter, bomber, 
and ground support units in the German Condor Legion actively fi ghting against the Republican Spanish 
forces, Herman Göring, while holding both the German Aviation and Economics Ministerial positions, 
authorized exports of arms to Republican Spain because of the prices the Germans could exact (Beevor 
2006, 329‒330). If the mark-up values for cooperation between ASU and Nicha were changed to the same 
as the values between ASU and Pajan (i.e.; from Mf1 =1.1, Mf2 =1.2, Mf3 =1.3 to Mf1 =1, Mf2 =1, Mf3 =1.1) 
then the monetary gains through cooperation no longer overcome the security loss associated with Nicha 
joining the weapon program in Stage 3. In this case, the model recommends that ASU complete the 
program by itself.
 The model recommended the same outcomes for Asu and North Rokea as it did for Asu and Nicha; only 
the number of BFGs were different. North Rokea did not have the technological ability to contribute to the 
X‒69 program. Additionally, because of poor North Rokea/Asu relations, Asu would suffer a security loss 
by allowing North Rokea to acquire any X‒69s. However, because of the lower security level of the BFG 
program, the model recommended North Rokea join that program at Stage 3. As seen above with the 
Asu/Nicha interaction in the BFG program, the monetary benefi ts outweigh the security losses for Asu by 
allowing North Rokea to join in Stage 3.
 Finally, the recommendations for Asu/Keximo interaction were split based on the program. Because of 
the high program security and marginal relations, Asu should not invite Keximo to join the X‒69 program 
at any stage. Additionally, because of Keximo’s limited technical ability in aircraft production, 
cooperation would not have yielded much improvement over an Asu-only developed X‒69. On the other 
hand, with a lower program security value and taking Keximo’s technical ability with infantry support 
weapons into consideration, the model recommended that Asu and Keximo should begin joint 
development of BFG in Stage 1. Both countries would benefi t from cooperation on the BFG development 
and Asu would get some minimal monetary gain as well through the mark
 Based on the US DoD Acquisition Management Framework presented in Section 1 and the case studies 
of recent and ongoing international military acquisitions programs described in Section 2, the model 
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presented in this paper produces recommendations on when countries should join together to produce 
military weapon systems. The case studies revealed that nations must consider technological level of and 
international relations with a potential partner, the technological diffi culty of a weapon program, and the 
security level of a program. Taking these factors into consideration and adding benefi ts of interoperability 
stemming from partner nations sharing the same equipment, a game theoretic model and payoff equations 
for possible model outcomes were presented in Section 3. Section 4 described a sample international 
community and weapon programs and used the model to create policy recommendations for which 
country should join which program at what level and when. Section 5 qualitatively reviewed the policy 
recommendations from Section 4.
 In its current form, this model’s intended use is by the US DoD to systematically produce recommenda-
tions for international military acquisitions cooperation with the objectives of decreasing program costs, 
decreasing program schedule, and improving fi nal product quality. With those objectives in mind, the 
model could be used for a timely review of all Department of Defense weapon development programs to 
take into account changes in international relations, national defense requirements, budget, and new 
program potential security gains. In a larger sense, this model could be used to aid military leaders in 
determining the most effi cient use of budget resources for all aspects of military activities. If a defi nition 
for national security gained per action or per unit cost could be created, or if the security gain of all 
actions could be ranked relatively, this model could be used to compare whether acquiring new equipment 
would provide as much benefi t as other activities such as training additional soldiers or updating military 
facilities.
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